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Company Name PepsiCo, Inc. 
Date 4/26/17 
Fiscal year ends (current period) 12/31/2017 (Q1 - Ends 3/25/17) 
Current Price $113.36 
52 week high (date) $114.605 (04/18/17) 
52 week low (date) $98.5 (12/01/16) 
Market Cap  $161.82B 
Enterprise Value $184.64B 
Total Debt $50.34B 
Cash $15.99B 
Net Debt/Enterprise Value 27.26% 
Dividend 2.66% 
Shares Outstanding/Float  1,428.2M/1,423.8M 
Current P/E  23.18x 
2019 P/E (EPS)  18.94x ($5.982) * 
2018 P/E (EPS)  20.04x ($5.554) * 
2017 P/E (EPS) 22.05x ($5.14) * 
2016 EPS  $4.85 ** 
2015 EPS  $4.57 ** 
2014 EPS $4.63 ** 
*Consensus Estimates as of 04/26/2017
**Comparable Actual from Bloomberg
Rating: SELL 
Target Price per Share: $81.25
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PepsiCo, Inc. (NYSE: PEP) is a global food and beverages company, most commonly known by its 
famous brands such as Pepsi-Cola and Frito-Lay. Using historical performance data, we have 
determined through a Probabilistic Discounted Cash Flow (P-DCF) analysis and Monte Carlo 
simulations that the company is fundamentally worth $81.25/share. Despite PepsiCo’s cost-
cutting efforts and reorientation of business to accommodate the shift of consumer 
preferences towards healthier and more eco-friendly food, the macroeconomic and political 
instability in PepsiCo’s emerging market segments, as well as the company’s high debt levels 
lead us to conclude that PepsiCo does not have the revenue generating potential to justify the 
current market price. For all the reasons above, we rate PepsiCo a SELL. 
Catalysts and Risks 
 
Catalysts 
• Positive revenue growth from earnings report on April 26, 2017. 
• The company's cost cutting efforts have helped pad the bottom line. 
• The company’s efforts at adapting to new consumer trends have partially reduced losses, 
if not increased revenue. 
• Trump Tax Relief. 
 
Risks 
• Consumers have become more health- and environmentally conscious, resulting in a 
general shift of consumer preferences away from PepsiCo’s traditional products. 
• Competitive pressures against other large food and beverages companies that are also 
struggling against the shift in consumer preferences. 
• Foreign exchange headwinds from PepsiCo’s global operations. 
• Political and financial instability, which has especially impacted PepsiCo’s Latin America 
segment. 




PepsiCo, Inc. was incorporated in Delaware in 1919 and reincorporated in North Carolina in 
1986. It is a leading global food and beverage company with a complementary portfolio of 
popular brands, including Frito-Lay, Gatorade, Pepsi-Cola, Quaker, and Tropicana. Through its 
operations, authorized bottlers, contract manufacturers and other third parties, the company 
makes, markets, distributes, and sells a wide variety of beverages, foods, and snacks in more 
than 200 countries and territories. 
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PepsiCo divides its operations into six geographical and product segments: Frito-Lay North 
America (FLNA), Quaker Foods North America (QFNA), North America Beverages (NAB), Latin 
America, Europe Sub-Saharan Africa (ESSA), and Asia, Middle East, and North Africa (AMENA). 
Table 1 below displays relevant information concerning each segment’s sales performance in 
2016 as well as their respective compound annual growth rates (CAGR). 
 
Table 1: Summary of PepsiCo Geographical and Product Segments. 
 
 Nominal sales in 2016 Margin on total sales in 2016 CAGR 
FLNA 15,549 24.76% 3.45% 
QFNA 2,564 4.08% -0.46% 
NAB 21,312 33.94% 2.00% 
Latin America 6,820 10.86% -9.93% 
ESSA 10,216 16.27% -9.60% 
AMENA 6,338 10.09% -0.48% 
Total 62,799 100.00% -1.04% 
 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.55, and author’s calculations. 
 
At a glance, it becomes evident that the majority of PepsiCo’s segments are declining, 
particularly the international segments (Latin America, ESSA, and AMENA). This is an indication 
of the food and beverage industry-wide distress as well as some issues endogenous to 
PepsiCo’s business structure that will be discussed throughout this paper. 
 
FLNA makes, markets, distributes, and sells branded snack foods either independently or in 
conjunction with third parties. These foods include Lay’s potato chips, Doritos tortilla chips, 
Cheetos cheese-flavored snacks, Tostitos tortilla chips, branded dips, Fritos corn chips, Ruffles 
potato chips, and Santitas tortilla chips. FLNA’s branded products are sold to independent 
distributors and retailers. In addition, FLNA’s joint venture with Strauss Group makes, markets, 
distributes, and sells Sabra refrigerated dips and spreads. 
 
QFNA makes, markets, distributes, and sells cereals, rice, pasta, and other branded products 
either independently or in conjunction with third parties. QFNA’s products include Quaker 
oatmeal, Aunt Jemima mixes and syrups, Quaker Chewy granola bars, Cap’n Crunch cereal, 
Quaker grits, Life cereal, Rice-A-Roni side dishes, Quaker rice cakes, Quaker simply granola, and 
Quaker oat squares. These branded products are sold to independent distributors and retailers. 
 
NAB makes, markets, distributes, and sells beverage concentrates, fountain syrups, and finished 
goods under various beverage brands including Pepsi, Gatorade, Mountain Dew, Aquafina, Diet 
Pepsi, Diet Mountain Dew, Tropicana Pure Premium, Mist Twst, and Mug, either independently 
or in conjunction with third parties. NAB also, either independently or in conjunction with third 
 4 
Investment Thesis for PepsiCo, Inc. (NYSE: PEP) by Maria Belen Wu 
EN.570.470 Applied Economics and Finance – Spring 2017 
 
parties, makes, markets and sells ready-to-drink tea and coffee products through joint ventures 
with Unilever (under the Lipton brand name) and Starbucks, respectively. Further, NAB 
manufactures and distributes certain brands licensed from Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. 
(DPSG), including Dr Pepper, Crush, and Schweppes, and certain juice brands licensed from Dole 
Food Company, Inc. (Dole) and Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. (Ocean Spray). NAB operates its 
own bottling plants and distribution facilities and sells branded finished goods directly to 
independent distributors and retailers. NAB also sells concentrate and finished goods to 
authorized and independent bottlers, who in turn sell PepsiCo’s branded finished goods to 
independent distributors and retailers in certain markets. 
 
Latin America makes, markets, distributes, and sells a number of snack food brands including 
Doritos, Cheetos, Marias Gamesa, Lay’s, Ruffles, Emperador, Saladitas, Rosquinhas Mabel, 
Sabritas, and Tostitos, as well as many Quaker-branded cereals and snacks, either 
independently or in conjunction with third parties. Latin America also, either independently or 
in conjunction with third parties, makes, markets, distributes, and sells beverage concentrates, 
fountain syrups, and finished goods under various beverage brands including Pepsi, 7UP, 
Gatorade, Toddy, Mirinda, Manzanita Sol, H2oh!, and Diet Pepsi. These branded products are 
sold to authorized bottlers, independent distributors, and retailers. Latin America also, either 
independently or in conjunction with third parties, makes, markets, and sells ready-to-drink tea 
through an international joint venture with Unilever (under the Lipton brand name). PepsiCo 
deconsolidated its Venezuelan subsidiaries, effective as of the end of the third quarter of 2015. 
 
ESSA makes, markets, distributes, and sells a number of leading snack food brands including 
Lay’s, Walkers, Doritos, Cheetos, and Ruffles, as well as many Quaker-branded cereals and 
snacks, through consolidated businesses as well as through non-controlled affiliates, either 
independently or in conjunction with third parties. ESSA also, either independently or in 
conjunction with third parties, makes, markets, distributes, and sells beverage concentrates, 
fountain syrups and finished goods under various beverage brands including Pepsi, Pepsi Max, 
7UP, Mirinda, Diet Pepsi, and Tropicana. These branded products are sold to authorized 
bottlers, independent distributors and retailers. In certain markets, however, ESSA operates its 
own bottling plants and distribution facilities. ESSA also, either independently or in conjunction 
with third parties, makes, markets, and sells ready-to-drink tea products through an 
international joint venture with Unilever (under the Lipton brand name). In addition, ESSA 
makes, markets, sells, and distributes a number of leading dairy products including Chudo, 
Agusha, and Domik v Derevne. 
 
AMENA makes, markets, distributes, and sells a number of leading snack food brands including 
Lay’s, Kurkure, Chipsy, Cheetos, Doritos, and Crunchy through consolidated businesses, as well 
as through non-controlled affiliates, either independently or in conjunction with third parties. 
Further, either independently or in conjunction with third parties, AMENA makes, markets, 
distributes, and sells many Quaker-branded cereals and snacks. AMENA also makes, markets, 
distributes, and sells beverage concentrates, fountain syrups, and finished goods under various 
beverage brands including Pepsi, Mirinda, 7UP, Aquafina, Mountain Dew, and Tropicana. These 
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branded products are sold to authorized bottlers, independent distributors, and retailers. In 
certain markets, however, AMENA operates its own bottling plants and distribution facilities. 
AMENA also, either independently or in conjunction with third parties, makes, markets, 
distributes, and sells ready-to-drink tea products through an international joint venture with 
Unilever (under the Lipton brand name). Besides, PepsiCo licenses the Tropicana brand for use 
in China on cobranded juice products in connection with a strategic alliance with Tingyi 




PepsiCo’s products are brought to market through direct-store-delivery (DSD), customer 
warehouse, and distributor networks. The distribution system used depends on customer 
needs, product characteristics, and local trade practices. 
 
PepsiCo, its independent bottlers, and distributors operate DSD systems that deliver beverages, 
foods and snacks directly to retail stores where the products are merchandised by our 
employees or our independent bottlers. DSD enables the company to merchandise with 
maximum visibility and appeal, and is especially well-suited to products that are restocked 
often and respond to in-store promotion and merchandising. 
 
Some of PepsiCo’s products are delivered from its manufacturing plants and warehouses to 
customer warehouses. These less costly systems generally work best for products that are less 
fragile and perishable, and have lower turnover. 
 
Lastly, PepsiCo distributes many products through third-party distributors. Third-party 
distributors are particularly effective when greater distribution reach can be achieved by 
including a wide range of products on the delivery vehicles. For example, PepsiCo’s food-service 
and vending business distributes beverages, foods, and snacks to restaurants, businesses, 





PepsiCo’s stock has performed comparably to the S&P 500 over the last five years. Indeed, 
upon inspection of the stock price versus the SPX, it is clear that it correlates strongly to the 
overall market. Many investors consider PEP an attractive option for a defensive stock during 
times of poor market performance, due to the sheer size of the company and its stable revenue 
stream.3 However, since mid-2016, PEP has seen a significant upside movement and has 
1 PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, Part I, Item 1, “Business,” p.3-4. 
2 PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, Part I, Item 1, “Business,” p.4-5. 
3 “PepsiCo: What to Expect,” Seeking Alpha, March 20, 2017, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4056648-pepsico-expect.  
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consistently outperformed the S&P 500. Given this recent bullish trend, it has become riskier to 
open a new position in the stock. These trends are outlined in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: PepsiCo’s stock performance (green) vs. the S&P 500 (white), 2012-2017. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <GP>. Accessed 03/16/17. 
 
Historical evidence supports the claim that PEP is a good defensive stock pick. Notice that for 
the period of 2012 to 2015, the stock performed more consistently than the market, 
diminishing volatility risk for investors. However, from 2015 onwards, PEP’s price stability has 
been compromised. This is mainly related to increased global political instability, such as forced 
expropriations and nationalizations of private businesses by the socialist regime in Venezuela, 
the US- and EU-backed economic sanctions on Russia for the annexation of Crimea and other 
violations, and most recently the US presidential elections. These events have increased 
volatility risk for PepsiCo’s international segments, and have thus resulted in more dramatic 
fluctuations in the PEP stock price. 
 
In addition, PepsiCo’s stock performance over the last five years is strongly correlated to its 
sector benchmark, the S&P 500 Consumer Staples Sector Index. Figure 2 below shows that 
PepsiCo has slightly outperformed both the S&P 500 and the sector benchmark in terms of total 
returns over the last five years. 
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Figure 2: PepsiCo’s stock performance (white) vs. the S&P 500 (orange) and the S&P 500 
Consumer Staples Sector Index (yellow), 2012-2017. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <COMP>. Accessed 03/16/17. 
 
Concerning net sales, PepsiCo displays a cyclical seasonal sales pattern. We have noticed that 
Q3 and Q4 earnings are always highest and Q1 earnings lowest, mainly due to higher beverage 
sales during the warmer months, offsetting certain food and dairy sales that are higher in the 
cooler months. These historical trends are illustrated in terms of quarterly earnings per share 
(EPS) in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: PepsiCo’s Quarterly Adjusted EPS. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <EM>. Accessed 03/16/17. 
 
Finally, analyst ratings for PepsiCo are highly positive. Figure 4 below shows that currently, 18 
analysts mark PEP as a buy, 9 as a hold, and 0 as a sell. The bullish recommendations are likely a 
reflection of PepsiCo’s earnings report on April 26, 2017, which showed that total revenue rose 
2% from the prior year to $12.04 billion, beating analyst forecasts for $11.98 billion.4 
Nevertheless, we have substantial reasons to differ from Wall Street’s consensus through the 
fundamental valuation lens. 
4 PepsiCo Investor Relations, “Q1 2017 PepsiCo Earnings,” http://www.pepsico.com/Investors.  
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Figure 4: Analyst Ratings for PepsiCo. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <ANR>. Accessed 04/26/17. 
Model Assumptions 
 
The P-DCF took into account PepsiCo’s historical revenue growth, expenses, and operational 
strategy as well as guidance from management (from 10-K, 10-Q, and DEF-14A reports) and 
Wall Street analysts’ consensus estimates (from reports published in Bloomberg). 
 
We chose to follow the 10-K report’s revenue stream breakdown for our revenue projections, 
namely the aforementioned product and geographical segments. Figure 5 below shows 
PepsiCo’s revenue distribution by geography over the last three years, as reported in the 10-K. 
Notice that with the exception of North America segment, emerging market segments have 
exhibited diminishing revenues from 2014 to 2016, revealing a source of growth hindrance for 
PepsiCo. 
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Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
These results are contained in the Balance Sheet and Income Statement tabs of the 
accompanying spreadsheet. 
 
The most noticeable line item in PepsiCo’s balance sheet is the increase in long-term debt 
obligations in fiscal 2014-2015, as well as a relatively large increase in short-term debt 
obligations in fiscal 2016. These increases in debt were due to issuances of commercial paper 
(0.6% and 0.3%) in 2016, in addition to a large increase in notes due in 2022-2046 (3.7% and 
3.9%). Another reason why PepsiCo’s debt has increased in recent years is that shareholders’ 
equity has declined in relative terms as a capital source for the company, reflected in the debt 
to equity ratio. 
 
In addition, fiscal 2014 show a rather sharp dip in cash and cash equivalents. This was caused by 
an increase in cash used for financing activities. This was reflected as a remittance of $6 
billion of international cash to the United States through a return of basis in the fourth quarter 
of 2014, which was used to repay commercial paper borrowings. 
 
In the income statement, we see that top-line revenue has been declining since fiscal 2015 at a 
CAGR of -1.04%. Besides, taking into account that fiscal 2016 results include an extra week of 
results, which increased 2016 net revenue by $657 million, it becomes evident that PepsiCo’s 
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revenue generating abilities have not vastly improved despite the implementation of several 
cost-cutting measures. 
 
Furthermore, in the line item Venezuela impairment charges, we see the one-time expense 
incurred in fiscal 2015 related to the divestiture of PepsiCo’s Venezuela operations. In their 10-
K, the company claims that “conditions in Venezuela, including restrictive exchange control 
regulations and reduced access to U.S. dollars through official currency exchange markets, have 
resulted in an other-than-temporary lack of exchangeability between the Venezuelan bolivar 
and the U.S. dollar.” 5  The exchange restrictions and other conditions have therefore 
significantly impacted PepsiCo’s ability to effectively manage our businesses in Venezuela, 
including limiting our ability to import certain raw materials and to settle U.S. dollar-
denominated obligations, and have restricted the company’s ability to realize the earnings 
generated out of its Venezuelan businesses. 
 
As a result of these factors, PepsiCo concluded that, effective as of the end of the third quarter 
of 2015, the company did not meet the accounting criteria for control over its wholly-owned 
Venezuelan subsidiaries, and it no longer had significant influence over the beverage joint 
venture with its franchise bottler in Venezuela. Therefore, effective at the end of the third 
quarter of 2015, PepsiCo deconsolidated its Venezuelan subsidiaries and began accounting for 
its investments in its Venezuelan subsidiaries and joint venture using the cost method of 
accounting. 
 
As expected from a large multinational company, especially given the losses it has incurred in 
Venezuela, PepsiCo hedges against foreign exchange risk using derivatives. The company’s 
foreign currency derivatives had a total notional value of $1.6 billion as of December 31, 2016 
and $2.1 billion as of December 26, 2015. The total notional amount of PepsiCo’s debt 
instruments designated as net investment hedges was $0.8 billion as of December 31, 2016. At 
the end of 2016, the company estimates that an unfavorable 10% change in the underlying 
exchange rates would have decreased net unrealized gains in 2016 by $122 million.6 
 
Value Drivers 
These results are contained in the Value Drivers tab of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
 
PEP’s top-line revenue growth has exhibited an average decline of -1.01% over the last 5 years, 
with a standard deviation of 3.05%. Fiscal 2015 exhibited the most negative growth of -5.44%, 
which reflects the impact of the Venezuelan divestiture. 
 
Regarding operating costs, Cost of sales reflects a consistent decrease over the last five years, 
the result of PepsiCo’s cost-cutting operations outlined in their 2014 Multi-Year Productivity 
Plan. It consists of a series of productivity initiatives that the company believes will strengthen 
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its food, snack and beverage businesses, such as: accelerating investment in manufacturing 
automation; further optimizing PepsiCo’s global manufacturing footprint, including closing 
certain manufacturing facilities; reengineering go-to-market systems in developed markets; 
expanding shared services; and implementing simplified organization structures to drive 
efficiency.7 
 
SG&A expenses have remained relatively constant at an average of 38.65% with a standard 
deviation of 0.53%. In addition, non-operating costs have remained relatively constant as well, 




Figure 6: PepsiCo’s Estimated FCF/Share. 
Source: Crystal Ball, Monte Carlo simulation on Estimated FCF/Share. 
 
Based on our assumptions, the P-DCF model yielded a FCF of $81.25/share. Figure 6 shows that 
the current market value of $113.36 is positioned at the 99.3th percentile, a telltale sign of a 
significant overvaluation. The distribution of share prices ranges from $24.37 to $142.61, which 
accounts for a spectrum of positive and negative scenarios for the company. 
 
It is important to take into account that we used very optimistic growth assumptions for each of 
PEP’s business segments, in an attempt to recreate the best-case scenario for the company’s 
future, i.e. all foreign exchange headwinds are overcome, political instability in emerging 
markets is reduced, and PEP successfully adapts to shifting consumer preferences. Even with 
these optimistic projections, our estimated FCF/share was 28.33% lower than the current 
market price. 
7 PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, Part II, Item 7, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations,” p.91. 
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Concerning the model tuning parameters, our assumptions accurately reflect the consistent 
upward trend observed in the last two years for FROIC and PFCFY. As shown in Figure 7, our 
assumed long-term asset turns (LTAT) average was higher in our model than in historical levels 
(0.93 vs. 0.78), despite the historical downward trend. This means that we assumed that the 
company efficiency relative to its long-term assets would be higher than in the past, which is 
explained by our overly optimistic projections and reflects we are bullish on PepsiCo’s ability to 
execute its efficiency plans. 
 
 
Figure 7: PepsiCo’s Average LTAT. 
Source: Crystal Ball, Monte Carlo simulation on Average LTAT. 
 
On a multiple basis, the P-DCF model’s implied P/E estimates are much lower than the market 
consensus for PepsiCo’s 2017E P/E (13.27x vs. 23.18x). The market consensus P/E is positioned 
at the 99.9th percentile, again indicating an overvaluation. This is shown in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8: PepsiCo’s Implied P/E. 
Source: Crystal Ball, Monte Carlo simulation on Implied P/E. 
 
Overall, it would be fair to conclude from the Monte Carlo simulations that PepsiCo’s stock is 
clearly overvalued. It is understandable that Wall Street’s outlook is more positive than ours, 
given their assumption of an opportunity cost of 6.3% given by WACC. However, at the 10% 
hurdle rate that we use in our model, and using highly optimistic model assumptions and EPS 
estimates that are still bullish compared to Wall Street, we obtained a much lower target price 
per share of $81.25. This confirms our previous assertion that PepsiCo deserves a solid sell 
rating. 
 
Capital Allocation and Management Discussion 
 
Capital Sources Analysis 
 
PepsiCo has a very high cash-generating capability, despite the evident volatility in the most 
recent five years. The company relies on a combination of cash, equity and debt to finance its 
activities. 
 
The company’s primary sources of cash available to fund cash outflows, such as anticipated 
share repurchases, dividend payments and scheduled debt maturities, include cash from 
operations and proceeds obtained from issuances of commercial paper and long-term debt. As 
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of December 31, 2016, PepsiCo had cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments in their 
consolidated subsidiaries of $15.2 billion outside the United States. Figure 9 below shows the 
company’s cash activity: 
 
 
Figure 9: PepsiCo’s use of cash, 2014-2016. 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.72. 
 
PepsiCo uses free cash flow primarily for financing activities, including debt repayments, 
dividends and share repurchases, as expected from a large and established company in a 
mature industry. Currently, the company expects to keep returning free cash flow to 
shareholders through dividends and share repurchases while maintaining Tier 1 commercial 
paper access (elaborated on in Return to Shareholders section). Figure 10 below reconciles net 




Figure 10: PepsiCo’s net cash provided by operating activities, 2014-2016. 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.73. 
 
In recent years, and particularly in fiscal 2016, PepsiCo’s debt reflects an upward trend, both in 
short-term and long-term obligations. It stands at a net debt to enterprise value ratio of 20.57%, 
which is high relative to its competitors but not unhealthy given the high corporate bond 
ratings (elaborated on in following section). 
 
PepsiCo’s debt is sustainable into the foreseeable future, mainly because interest rates are so 
low. In fact, interest expense in fiscal 2016 was just 2.1% of the company's sales. Hence there is 
no particular reason to believe that PepsiCo can't handle the debt it has taken on. Moreover, 
from a business model perspective, since the company sells relatively small items on a very 
frequent basis, it should have plenty of money coming in the door to keep current on its debts. 
The following figure shows the breakdown of the company’s debt obligations. 
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Figure 11: PepsiCo’s short- and long-term debt obligations, 2015-2016. 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.114. 
 
The main reason why PepsiCo’s debt has increased in recent years is that shareholders’ equity 
has declined in relative terms as a capital source for the company, reflected in the debt to 
equity ratio. Several factors contributed to this result. First, the company completed a stock 
buyback worth $18.7 billion from 2010 to 2014, and it purchased additional shares worth $3.2 
billion for the nine-month period ending Sept. 30, 2015. These purchases have contributed 
greatly to reducing PepsiCo's shareholders' equity. The company also consistently pays 
dividends, which further decreases the book value of equity. This reduction in equity caused the 
D/E ratio to increase. All other things equal, a higher D/E ratio may indicate a relatively higher 
risk for a company. 
 
Concerning shareholders’ equity, PepsiCo has continued to issue additional common and 
preferred stock after its IPO. In fiscal 2016, the company issued 1.426 billion shares of 3.6 
billion authorized shares, net of repurchased common stock at a par value of 1 2/3¢ per share. 
In addition, as of December 31, 2016, there were 3 million shares of convertible preferred stock 
authorized, of which there were 803,953 preferred shares issued and 122,553 shares 
outstanding. The outstanding preferred shares had a fair value of $64 million as of December 
31, 2016. These additional stock issuances are the product of stock splits over the years as the 
company continues to grow. Many analysts think that PepsiCo is currently due for another 
stock split, at its current share price of $113.36 (as of 04/26/17). Thus, these issuances should 
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PepsiCo’s leverage ratio (Net Debt/EBITDA) for fiscal 2016 is 2.84x, down from 2.90x in fiscal 
2015 and up from 2.38x in fiscal 2014. The higher leverage is mainly accounted for by the 
higher increase in debt in 2015 and 2016, as mentioned above, as well as a decrease in sales 
revenue. 
 
Figure 12 below shows the corporate debt ratings for PepsiCo by independent rating agencies. 
Note that despite the increases in debt, S&P revised its outlook for PepsiCo from stable to 
positive in April 2016, citing that the company’s revenue growth had been strong despite 
foreign exchange headwinds. It hinted at the possibility of upgrading PepsiCo if the company 
continued to grow its operating margins and maintained Net Debt/EBITDA near or below 2.5x 
over the next 12-24 months.8 However, this upgrade has not materialized. 
 
 
Figure 12: PepsiCo’s Corporate Debt Ratings. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <CRPR>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
PepsiCo’s debt distribution is represented in the following two figures. Figure 13 shows that the 
majority of PepsiCo’s obligations are in the form of bonds (blue columns) that are backstopped 
by undrawn revolvers (green columns). The company does not engage in municipal issuances. 
8 “Pepsico inc. Outlook revised to positive on improved operating margins; 'A' rating affirmed,” Reuters, April 21, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFWN17O131.  
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Figure 13: PepsiCo’s Debt Maturity Profile. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <DDIS>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
An individual bond inspection of PEP 3 1/8 due on 11/01/20 reveals that this bond has traded 
down, experiencing a sharp drop on the eve of the US elections in November 2016. However, it 
is still clearly healthy given that it is trading well above par. This is roughly the same price at 
which it was trading in December 2015, and it has not fallen below that average, as shown in 
Figure 14 below. 
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Figure 14: PepsiCo’s PEP 3 1/8 bond due on 11/01/20. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <DDIS><DES><GP>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
Upon examination of the medium- and long-term bonds shown in the figures below, this trend 
holds for most of PepsiCo’s bonds. Apart from potential market fears roused by the uncertainty 
of Donald Trump’s policies, it seems that investors are showing more interest in PepsiCo stocks 
as opposed to bonds, as stock price continue to increase. Besides, as previously mentioned, PEP 
bond prices are currently trading at above par prices, approximately at $103 for PEP 3 1/8, $98 
for PEP 2 ¾, and $122 for PEP 5 ½. This has been the trend for most of the period shown in the 
bond price figures above in Figure 14 and below in Figure 15. Therefore, the current decline in 
price could also be attributed to yields not matching up with benchmark treasuries. In addition, 
the dip may also be due to bond investors believing that a 2.75% yield on a corporate bond that 
is 8 years from maturity is not as good as some treasury bonds. 
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Figure 15: PepsiCo’s PEP 3 ¾ bond due on 04/30/25 and PEP 5 ½ bond due on 01/05/40. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <DDIS><DES><GP>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
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An inspection of other A-, A, and A+ rated companies in the consumer staples and discretionary 
sectors reveals very similar yield curves. This indicates that PepsiCo’s current yield is 
comparable to that of other companies in the same sector, indicating an industry-wide 
phenomenon. This is shown in Figure 16 below. 
 
 
Figure 16: Current yield curves for Consumer Discretionary A+ (green), Consumer Staples A-, 
A, A- (blue), and Composite A (red).  
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <CRFV>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
Historical Allocation Analysis 
 
There has been a steady reduction in Cost of Sales as well as Working Capital over the course of 
the last 5 years. These are indications that management is likely in the midst of changing capital 
allocation priorities and/or there is some operating leverage in the business. It also reflects 
PepsiCo’s efforts at improving efficiency of revenue generation through various cost-cutting 
measures. 
 
Acquisitions and Divestitures 
 
By far, the biggest hit that PepsiCo took in fiscal 2015 and 2016 was the divestiture of its 
Venezuelan operations as previously mentioned. Conditions in Venezuela, including restrictive 
exchange control regulations and reduced access to U.S. dollars through official currency 
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exchange markets, have resulted in a lack of exchangeability between the Venezuelan bolivar 
and the US dollar. The exchange restrictions and other conditions have significantly impacted 
PepsiCo’s ability to effectively manage its businesses in Venezuela, by limiting the company’s 
ability to import certain raw materials and to settle dollar-denominated obligations, as well as 
restricting PepsiCo’s ability to realize the earnings generated out of its Venezuelan businesses. 
 
These conditions are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. As a result of these 
factors, PepsiCo decided that, effective as of the end of Q3 2015, it would deconsolidate its 
Venezuelan subsidiaries and begin accounting for its investments in its Venezuelan subsidiaries 
using the cost method of accounting. The company recorded pre- and after-tax charges of $1.4 
billion in the income statement to reduce the value of the cost method investments to their 
estimated fair values, resulting in a full impairment. The impairment charges primarily included 
approximately $1.2 billion related to investments in previously consolidated Venezuelan 
subsidiaries and a joint venture, in addition to $111 million related to the reclassification of 
cumulative translation losses.  
 
As of the end of 2016, consistent with the end of the third quarter of 2015, PepsiCo did not 
consolidate the assets and liabilities of its Venezuelan subsidiaries in the balance sheet. 
Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2015, PepsiCo’s financial results have not included the results 
of its Venezuelan businesses. The company does not have any guarantees related to its 
Venezuelan entities, and the ongoing contractual commitments to Venezuelan businesses are 
not material. PepsiCo has not received any cash in US dollars from its Venezuelan entities 
during Q4 2015 or fiscal 2016. PepsiCo states that it will continue to monitor the conditions in 
Venezuela and their impact on accounting and disclosures. 
 
The Venezuela divestiture aside, PepsiCo acquired KeVita, Inc. in fiscal 2016, a firm that 
produces flavored sparkling probiotic drinks. This acquisition was motivated by the shift in 
consumer demand towards healthier products, as well as tendencies of higher taxation of 
certain PepsiCo products that are targeted as unhealthy. Given these consumer and regulatory 
shifts, the company is trying to shift its portfolio toward more “good-for-you” and “better-for-
you” products, through both organic innovation and strategic M&As like KeVita. PepsiCo has 
increased its investment in R&D by 45% since 2011, investing approximately $3.5 billion 
cumulatively over the past five years. 
 
This strategy is yielding positive results. In fact, strong consumer demand for PepsiCo’s 
healthier drinks and snacks helped drive its better-than-expected results in Q1 2017. Its "guilt-
free products" – beverages that have fewer than 70 calories per 12 ounces and snacks that 
have lower amounts of salt and saturated fat, especially from the Quaker brand, – accounted 
for more than 45% of the company's revenue for the latest quarter.9 However, the fact remains 
that PepsiCo’s brands are still predominantly placed in the “indulgent food and beverage” 
category, and the company’s efforts at adapting to consumer trends have not been enough to 
9 Lauren Thomas, “Pepsi Doubles Down on Guilt-Free Options in Effort to Boost Sales,” CNBC, April 26, 2017, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/26/pepsi-doubles-down-on-guilt-free-options-in-effort-to-boost-sales.html.  
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offset the losses from its traditional segments, as well as its aforementioned foreign exchange 
headwinds. 
 
Last but not least, PepsiCo acquired Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods OJSC in 2011. Wimm-Bill Dann was 
Russia's leading branded food-and-beverage company, specializing mainly in dairy products and 
juice beverages. The investment proved financially attractive since it was expected to provide 
PepsiCo a strong, high-growth platform in the dairy category. However, this acquisition also 
greatly increased the company’s exposure to the fall of the Russian ruble with the commodity 
slump and crisis beginning in 2014, as well as the political instability that ensued from the 
annexation of Crimea and other military interventions in Ukraine. In particular, after the US and 
EU placed economic sanctions on Russia for its violations of international law, Russia responded 
with a nation-wide boycott and ban on American and European goods. PepsiCo was targeted by 
the Putin administration as an American corporation that deliberately usurped Russian 
economic opportunities. This caused sales revenue to dramatically decrease in the ESSA 
segment from fiscal 2014 to 2015, depicted in the negative revenue growth rate of -21.56%. 
 
Overall, PepsiCo’s past acquisitions have mostly aimed at increasing brand name and trademark 
ownership, but with the acquisition of KeVito, we can see an attempt of transformational 
acquisition, aiming to enrich the offer for its customers by responding to their demands for 
healthier alternatives. It is unfortunate that the company’s Russian and Venezuelan operations 
did not grow as expected, or else they would have boosted both Latin America and ESSA 
segment revenues. This may be an indication of poor country risk assessment of the company, 
but mostly just plain bad luck. 
 
Return to Shareholders 
 
PepsiCo has returned cash to shareholders via quarterly dividends since 1965. The current 
dividend yield is 2.66%, and the dividend coverage (Net Income/Dividend) is approximately 1.5, 
indicating sufficient coverage. 
 
The company has consistently participated in share repurchase programs. The latest is a $12 
billion repurchase program authorized by the Board of Directors and publicly announced on 
February 11, 2015, commenced on July 1, 2015 and will expire on June 30, 2018. Such shares 
may be repurchased in open market transactions, in privately negotiated transactions, in 
accelerated stock repurchase transactions or otherwise. 
 
Figures 17 and 18 below show PepsiCo’s common and preferred stock buybacks in Q4 2016. 
The buybacks were successful in boosting stock price and counteracting the effects of the US 
presidential election, starting an upward trend in 2017. 
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Figure 17: PepsiCo Issuer Purchases of Common Stock. 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.34. 
 
 
Figure 18: PepsiCo Issuer Purchases of Convertible Preferred Stock. 
Source: PEP 10-K Form filed 02/15/2017, p.35. 
 
It is noteworthy that management has been exclusively selling shares on the open market, as 
shown in Figure 19 below. Even though they are selling at high prices, it may not bode well for 
the company that its own managers have not bought a single stock since 2015 (elaborated on in 
Stock Ownership section). 
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Figure 19: PepsiCo Management Open Market Buy/Sell, 2015-2017. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <GPTR>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
Compensation and Corporate Governance 
 
Executives and Board of Directors 
 
Indra K. Nooyi has been PepsiCo’s Chief Executive Officer since 2006 and became the Chairman 
of PepsiCo’s Board of Directors in 2007. The other named executive officers are Albert P. Carey, 
Chief Executive Officer, North America; Sanjeev Chadha, Chief Executive Officer, Asia, Middle 
East and North Africa; Hugh F. Johnston, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; 
Mehmood Khan, Vice Chairman, Executive Vice President and Chief Scientific Officer, Global 
Research and Development. 
 
The Board of Directors has four Committees: Audit, Compensation, Nominating and Corporate 
Governance, and Public Policy and Sustainability. The current Board members are Shona L. 
Brown, George W. Buckley, Cesar Conde, Ian M. Cook (Presiding Director), Dina Dublon, Rona A. 
Fairhead, Richard W. Fisher, William R. Johnson, Indra K. Nooyi, David C. Page, Robert C. Pohlad, 





Investment Thesis for PepsiCo, Inc. (NYSE: PEP) by Maria Belen Wu 
EN.570.470 Applied Economics and Finance – Spring 2017 
 
Figure 20 below shows the 2016 target pay mix for the Chairman and CEO, as well as the 
average target pay mix for other NEOs. Most of the pay mix consists of performance-based 
compensation. This section focuses on PepsiCo’s policies regarding the annual cash incentive 
and long-term incentive as described in their latest DEF-14A filing. 
 
 
Figure 20: PepsiCo’s Chairman, CEO, and average NEO Target Pay Mix. 
Source: PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.43. 
 
Figure 21 below summarizes compensation decisions made by the Committee with respect to 
each of the NEOs from fiscal 2014 to 2016. 
 
 
Figure 21: PepsiCo’s NEO Compensation Breakdown, Fiscal 2014-2016. 
Source: DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.55. 
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Although the Compensation Committee states in the DEF-14A that annual salary increases are 
not automatic or guaranteed,10 it is worth noticing that both CEO Indra Nooyi and CFO Hugh 
Johnston got considerable raises in 2016 despite PepsiCo’s less-than-stellar performance. 
 
Annual Cash Incentive 
 
PepsiCo provides annual cash incentive opportunities to the NEOs under the PepsiCo Executive 
Incentive Compensation Plan (EICP). These awards are designed to drive company, business 
unit, and individual performance. In order to determine the actual annual incentive award 
payable to each executive officer, the Compensation Committee considers both business and 
individual performance. Figure 22 below illustrates the weighting of performance metrics for 
each NEO, with the exception of the Chairman and CEO, whose annual cash award is 
determined by the Compensation Committee and the independent members of the Board 
based on their assessment of the company’s performance and her leadership. 
 
 
Figure 22: PepsiCo’s Annual Incentive Award Performance Metrics and Weighting. 
Source: PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.44. 
 
The performance measures used in the annual incentive program relate to companywide 
performance or business unit performance, depending on the NEO’s position and scope of 
responsibility. The 2016 performance metrics used for each NEO are listed in Figure 23 below: 
 
 
Figure 23: PepsiCo’s Business Performance Metrics for NEO Compensation. 
Source: PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.45. 
 
Besides, Figure 24 below from Footnote 7 of the DEF-14A clarifies the adjustments made by the 
Compensation Committee to EPS, FCF and currency net income, which exclude one-time 
charges. In the case of 2016, Core Constant Currency Net Income Growth and Core Constant 
10  PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, “Executive Compensation,” p.44. 
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Currency EPS Growth exclude the impact of the Venezuela deconsolidation that occurred in 
2015, which is a fair practice. 
 
 
Figure 24: PepsiCo’s Adjustments to Business Performance Metrics. 
Source: PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.45. 
 
However, except for revenue growth and FCF, PepsiCo seems to have met its performance 
targets with a lot of ease in Q1 2017, which might be an indication that the bar was set too low. 
Especially considering PepsiCo’s struggles generating revenue in its international segments, it is 
rather dubious that the CEO deserves a 13% compensation boost, primarily from stock awards. 




PepsiCo’s long-term incentive program is 100% performance-based, with payouts based on 
performance against operating and market-focused metrics. These awards vest after three 
years if the executive is still employed with the company. 
 
The award is composed of 66% Stock Performance Units (PSUs), based on operating metrics 
(core constant currency EPS growth and core net ROIC improvement). The PSUs pay out in 
PepsiCo shares, plus dividends accrued over the vesting period on earned shares. The other 34% 
is made up of the Long-Term Cash Award (LTC), which is based on TSR relative to the proxy peer 
group, and pays out in cash. 
 
PepsiCo also uses a peer group to evaluate whether executive officer pay levels are aligned with 
the company’s performance on a relative basis. These companies are of comparable size (based 
on revenue and market capitalization), maintain strong consumer brands, have an innovative 
culture, compete with PepsiCo for executive talent, and/or possess significant international 
operations. 
 
The companies that met these criteria and were included in the peer group in fiscal 2016 are 
the following:12
11 Jackie Wattles, “Pepsi CEO Indra Nooyi gets big pay bump,” CNN Money, March 18, 2017, 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/18/news/companies/pepsi-indra-nooyi/.  
12 PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, “Executive Compensation,” p.51. 
 29 
                                                 
Investment Thesis for PepsiCo, Inc. (NYSE: PEP) by Maria Belen Wu 
EN.570.470 Applied Economics and Finance – Spring 2017 
 
• 3M Company 
• Abbott Laboratories 
• Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV 
• Apple, Inc. 
• The Coca-Cola Company 
• Colgate-Palmolive Company 
• General Electric Company 
• General Mills, Inc. 
• Groupe Danone 
• Hewlett-Packard Company 
• International Business Machines 
Corp. 
• Johnson & Johnson 
• Kellogg Company 
• The Kraft Heinz Company 
• McDonald’s Corporation 
• Mondelēz International, Inc. 
• Nestlé S.A. 
• Nike, Inc. 
• The Procter & Gamble Company 
• Unilever PLC 
• United Parcel Service, Inc. 
• Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
• The Walt Disney Company 
 
Furthermore, PepsiCo has implemented a share retention policy since 2001, in order to ensure 
that executive officers exhibit a strong commitment to PepsiCo stock ownership. The policy 
limits the proceeds that a NEO may receive in cash upon exercise of stock options during each 
calendar year to 20% of the aggregate value of all of the executive officer’s vested stock options. 
Any excess proceeds must be held in shares of PepsiCo common stock for at least one year 
after the date of exercise. In addition, NEOs are required to hold at least 50% of the shares, net 
of applicable tax withholding, received upon the vesting and payout of PSUs. NEOs who 
maintain the required level of stock ownership are exempt from this share retention policy.13 
 
Furthermore, through its clawback policy, PepsiCo reserves the right to cancel and recoup 
awards and gains from an executive in certain circumstances, such as if he or she engages in 
gross misconduct, violates applicable non-compete provisions, or causes or contributes to the 





Figure 25 shows the number of shares of common stock beneficially owned and the number of 
phantom units of common stock held in the company’s income deferral programs by each 
director (including each nominee), by each of the NEOs, and by all directors and executive 
officers, as of March 1, 2017. 
 
13 PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, “Executive Compensation,” p.52. 
14 PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, “2016 Director Compensation,” p.34. 
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Figure 25: PepsiCo’s Officers and Directors’ Stock Ownership. 
Source: PEP DEF-14A Form filed 03/17/2017, p.73. 
 
As of March 1, 2017, the directors and NEOs as a group beneficially owned less than 1% of 
PepsiCo’s outstanding common stock, and none of the directors or NEOs owned any shares of 
outstanding convertible preferred stock. 
 
The Figure 26 below might give the impression that management is actively buying shares. This 
is just an optical illusion. In actuality, in the last 3 months PepsiCo’s total number of shares 
bought by insiders was 0, and 648,926 were sold from a total of 648,926 traded shares. During 
the last 12 months, 55,338 shares were bought and 1,240,499 sold from a total of 1,295,837 
shares traded. A net activity of 648,926 took place in the course of 3 months, 1,185,161 during 
the last 12 months. In total, 5 trades held during the last 3 months and 56 during the last 12 
months, out of which 0 buys held in the last 3 months and 41 buys in the last 12 months. In 
contrast, 5 sells held in the last 3 months and 15 sells over the past 12 months. 
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Figure 26: PepsiCo Insider Trading. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <HDS>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
Moreover, the figure below shows that when compared to institutional holders, PepsiCo’s 
executive board holds very few shares. This renders the latter’s activity minimal in relative 
terms, which is unsurprising for a company the size of PepsiCo. 
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Figure 27: PepsiCo’s Top 40 Stockholders. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <HDS>. Accessed 04/02/17. 
 
Overall, PepsiCo’s executive compensation policies are in line with those of its peer groups, and 
do not present any loopholes that jeopardize the NEOs interest in the company’s performance. 
However, it is fair to conclude that the policies are quite lenient, as they have continued to give 
large pay raises to the NEOs despite stalling revenue growth and free cash flow. In addition, 
insider trading patterns confirm our analysis that management likely believes that the stock is 
overpriced and is thus actively unloading them into the open market. 
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For a company of its magnitude and recognition, PepsiCo, Inc.’s performance in the past five 
years has left a lot to be desired. The company’s investments and production facilities overseas 
have encountered several difficulties, from political and financial instability to foreign exchange 
headwinds. Furthermore, the general shift in consumer preferences in North America, its 
largest segment, away from junk food and towards healthy and environmentally-conscious 
consumption, has taken a toll on the food and beverage industry as a whole. Despite the 
company’s successful cost-cutting plans, it has still taken on a considerable amount of debt in 
recent years, and has not been able to offset the revenue losses caused by the aforementioned 
factors. On the whole, PepsiCo is still a financially sound company with conventional executive 
compensation guidelines, but its fundamental value and current revenue-generating 
capabilities cannot justify its current exorbitant share price nor its generous pay raises to its 
NEOs. Until PepsiCo can successfully overcome the hurdles mentioned above, we must rate the 
company a SELL. 
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